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Isser Harel (; 1912 – 18 February 2003) was spymaster of the intelligence and the security services of Israel and the Director of the Mossad (1952–1963). In his capacity as Mossad director, he oversaw the capture and covert transportation to Israel of Holocaust organizer Adolf Eichmann.
Harel was the only individual in the history of the State of Israel to hold a position that consolidated both internal and external intelligence responsibilities.
Whilst six years old, the Russian Civil War broke out, and Vitebsk changed hands several times between the White movement and the Red Army. He once attended a speech given by Leon Trotsky in his city. The Soviet Union regime confiscated the family's property, and they suffered from hunger.
In 1922, the family left the Soviet Union and relocated to the city of Daugavpils in independent Latvia. On their way, Soviet soldiers robbed them of their remaining possessions. In Daugavpils, he received a formal education, completing elementary school and beginning high school studies. In his book Security and Democracy, he describes a significant event in the city related to Rabbi Meir Simcha of Dvinsk, who served as the local rabbi. He writes that during a particularly rainy winter, the local river overflowed, threatening to breach the dam and flood the city. Rabbi Meir Simcha prayed for mercy, and shortly afterward, the waters began to recede, saving the city.
As he grew older, his Jewish national consciousness awakened, and he joined a Zionist youth movement. At the age of 16, Yisrael left for hachshara (agricultural training) in preparation for aliyah to Mandatory Palestine. During his year of training, he worked in agriculture, aspiring to join a kibbutz. In 1929, following the outbreak of the 1929 Arab riots, his group decided to expedite their immigration to Palestine to support the Yishuv. At 17, Yisrael obtained forged documents that claimed he was 18, which allowed him to receive a certificate of immigration (certificat) from the British Mandate. In early 1930, he made aliyah, crossing Europe from north to south and boarding a ship in Genoa bound for Palestine. He carried a pistol, which he concealed in a loaf of bread.
In 1944, Yisrael was summoned by Israel Amir (Zabludovsky), the commander of the Shai, who informed him that he was being assigned to serve in the Shai headquarters in Tel Aviv. This marked the beginning of his long career in commanding positions within the intelligence services of the pre-state Yishuv and later the intelligence community of Israel.
Yisrael began working at the Shai headquarters in Tel Aviv at the end of 1944, serving as the secretary of the "Jewish Department." The department was headed by Yosef Karo, and Yisrael served as his assistant. The department's role was internal security, and it dealt, among other things, with gathering intelligence on underground movements that did not accept the authority of the national institutions, such as the Irgun and Lehi, as well as on the activities of Communism. A few months after starting as the department's secretary, Yisrael was appointed to head the department.
In 1947, Yisrael's name came to the attention of David Ben-Gurion. He was introduced to Ben-Gurion and reported on the activities of his department. During that meeting, Ben-Gurion decided to rename the "Jewish Department" to the "Internal Department." Yisrael succeeded in his role and became an unofficial spokesman for the Shai. He maintained fair relations with members of other underground movements, who were under his department's surveillance.
At the Shai headquarters, Yisrael earned the nickname "Isser the Small," both due to his short stature and to distinguish him from "Isser the Great," Isser Be'eri (Birenzweig), who joined the Shai headquarters in 1947 and was tall in stature. Be'eri later became the head of Israeli Military Intelligence, but was dismissed following the Ali Qassem Abed al-Qader affair.
In 1947, Yisrael was appointed the commander of the Tel Aviv District of the Shai, responsible for gathering intelligence from Arab Jaffa. This was a challenging period for the Shai, following Black Saturday and due to the decline in the number of Arab informants, a result of the national awakening among Jaffa's Arabs leading up to the War of Independence. Yisrael took steps to recruit new sources and succeeded in doing so. Shortly before the declaration of the State of Israel, Yisrael deployed an Arab agent on a mission to Amman to assess Jordan's intentions and whether they planned to go to war. The agent reported that the Jordanians intended to join the war, and Yisrael hurried to inform Ben-Gurion.
The service under Yisrael's leadership had to be built from scratch, determining its principles, organizational structure, and methods of operation. One of the basic principles he established was that the employees of the organization had to be full-fledged government employees, with appropriate ranking, salary, and social benefits, without the special privileges and perks typically associated with secret service personnel in undemocratic countries. Another principle set by Yisrael was that employees had to maintain a high moral standard, with no criminal background and no adventurist tendencies. This principle, he claimed, was not adopted by military intelligence at that time, leading to scandals such as the Avri Elad and Mordechai Kedar cases.
Yisrael also decided to break down the political and party-based barriers that existed before the establishment of the state. He employed, without distinction, former members of the Haganah, Palmach, Irgun, and Lehi in the Shin Bet and later in the Mossad. This inclusive approach allowed individuals such as Yitzhak Shamir, a former commander of the Lehi and later Prime Minister of Israel, to be integrated into Israel's intelligence services. This policy contrasted with the prevailing sentiment of the time, expressed by David Ben-Gurion in his policy of "Without Herut and Maki", which marginalized members of the political right. Employing right-wing figures in government institutions was not common practice.
During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the Shin Bet was primarily engaged in internal security matters. After the war, the service expanded its operations to include counter-espionage and the monitoring of Israeli Arabs for intelligence purposes.
In 1951, the Mossad for Intelligence and Special Operations was established, with Reuven Shiloah as its head. In September 1952, Shiloah resigned and suggested to David Ben-Gurion that Yisrael Halperin (now known as Isser Harel) replace him.
For eleven years, Harel served as the head of Israeli intelligence services, during which time the organizational structures and operational methods of the security services were formed and refined. These years also saw significant intelligence and security achievements. In 1953, the Shin Bet successfully exposed the right-wing extremist underground, leading to the prosecution of its members. However, some critics claimed that Harel exhibited authoritarian behavior and tended to bypass legal boundaries when necessary, as seen in the case of Operation Bren, where the body of an Israeli officer suspected of selling military secrets to Egypt was secretly disposed of following his accidental death during his arrest.
Isser Harel, concerned that pro-Soviet parties in Israel might act against Israeli interests and align with the Soviet Union if a global conflict erupted, directed surveillance against the Israeli Communist Party (formerly the Palestine Communist Party), which had been under the surveillance of the Shai since the Mandate period. This surveillance continued under the Shin Bet. In this context, Harel authorized an operation that later became a source of significant controversy: the surveillance and wiretapping of Mapam—a mainstream, Zionism leftist party with Marxist leanings, particularly due to the pro-Soviet stance of some of its members, such as Moshe Sneh.
Harel, worried about Sneh's influence and the pro-Soviet faction within Mapam, ordered a wiretap to be placed in the office of Meir Ya'ari, one of the party's leaders. On 28 January 1953, two Shin Bet agents were caught by Mapam members while installing the wiretap in Ya'ari's office. The incident sparked a public scandal. Shortly afterward, Sneh and his followers broke away from Mapam to form the "Left Faction," advocating a more openly pro-Soviet policy, and eventually left the party altogether. Although the wiretap operation created a political firestorm, the intelligence gained from it was significant.
Harel was also instrumental in the arrest of Aharon Cohen, one of the leaders of Mapam and a prominent figure in the Kibbutz Artzi movement, who was convicted of espionage in 1958 after meeting with a Soviet diplomat. Cohen's arrest and subsequent conviction sent shockwaves through the Israeli left, as he was considered a mainstream leader within the party. Harel argued that Cohen's actions went beyond legitimate political meetings and crossed into criminal espionage.
This incident involved a group of German scientists who were assisting the Egyptian government in developing advanced rocket technology, which posed a significant threat to Israel. Harel viewed the presence of these scientists as a grave danger and launched a covert campaign to intimidate and disrupt their work. Mossad agents in Europe attempted to discourage the scientists through a variety of means, including sending threatening letters and engaging in sabotage.
However, after two Mossad operatives were caught in Switzerland for issuing threats against one of the scientists’ daughters, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion ordered the Mossad to halt its operations. Harel, convinced that the scientists represented an existential threat to Israel, strongly disagreed with Ben-Gurion's decision. He believed that Ben-Gurion underestimated the danger and felt that the Prime Minister's focus on maintaining positive relations with West Germany was misguided.
Despite Harel's protests, Ben-Gurion stood firm. Faced with this disagreement, Harel resigned from his post as head of the Mossad and Shin Bet in March 1963. His resignation marked the end of an era in Israeli intelligence, as Harel had been the central figure in shaping the country's security services since their inception. Harel's departure from the intelligence community left a lasting legacy, but also set the stage for years of tension between him and his successors, particularly Meir Amit, who replaced him as head of the Mossad.
In 1957, members of the West Germany government provided Israel with information that Adolf Eichmann was hiding in Argentina under the name "Ricardo Klement". Eichmann, as director of Department IV-B4 of Nazi Germany's Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) during the Second World War, had played a crucial role in the planning and execution of the so-called "Final Solution to the Jewish Question". Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion believed that seeking Eichmann's extradition from Argentina by legal and diplomatic methods would be unsuccessful. In 1959, he placed Harel in charge of the operation to locate, seize, and secretly extract Eichmann from Argentina, with the intention of returning him to Israel to stand trial. In April 1960, Harel's team of agents arrived in Buenos Aires, and tracked Eichmann to a residence in the San Fernando neighborhood of the city. Harel followed soon after. On May 11, they kidnapped Eichmann as he walked from a bus stop to his home."Israeli spymaster led ‘Operation Eichmann’", Daily Telegraph (London), 19 February 2003 Days later, Eichmann was drugged and clandestinely placed on an Israeli diplomatic aircraft, disguised as a crew member. He was flown to Tel Aviv. According to Harel himself, when he arrived back in Israel with the captured Eichmann, Harel went to Ben-Gurion's office and told the prime minister:
Eichmann was convicted and executed in 1962. This operation not only represented a major victory for the Israeli intelligence services but also had a profound impact on public awareness of the Holocaust worldwide. Harel later chronicled the operation in his bestselling book, "The House on Garibaldi Street", which was adapted into a movie in 1979.
The Shin Bet also achieved a major success in 1961 with the exposure of Israel Beer, a prominent IDF officer and military commentator, as a Soviet spy. Bar was convicted and sentenced to ten years in prison. In the same year, another notable espionage case involved the arrest of Kurt Sitte, a professor of physics at the Technion, who was discovered to be spying for Czechoslovakia. While this case did not have the same impact as Bar's, it was still significant in highlighting the vulnerability of Israel to Soviet-bloc intelligence operations.
Another major incident during Harel's tenure was the Yossele Schumacher affair, which began in 1960 when Yossele Schumacher, a boy from a secular Jewish family, was kidnapped by his ultra-Orthodox grandfather, Nachman Shtarkes, and taken to the United States to be raised in a religious environment. Despite extensive efforts to locate the child, the case baffled Israeli authorities. Eventually, in 1962, Harel assigned the case to the Mossad, which successfully tracked Schumacher to an ultra-Orthodox community in Brooklyn. The boy was returned to his parents, and the case became a landmark in Israel's internal security operations.
Harel continued to be involved in public life through his writing and his outspoken views on national security matters. His books, such as The House on Garibaldi Street and The Great Deception, offered insights into the world of Israeli intelligence and earned him recognition as a leading authority on security issues.
Isser Harel passed away on February 18, 2003, at the age of 91. He is remembered as one of Israel's founding fathers of intelligence, whose leadership and vision helped to secure the state during its most vulnerable early years.
Streets and public institutions have been named in his honor, including "Isser Harel Street" in cities like Netanya and Herzliya. Harel's contributions to Israel's security apparatus continue to be studied and respected by generations of intelligence professionals.
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